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ESSAY-THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE:
MUST YOU SUE YOUR LAWYER WHILE SHE STILL REPRESENTS
YOU?
Timothy 0. Dudley*
I. INTRODUCTION

Lawyers are being sued with increasing frequency. A lawyer's
representation of her client often continues for several years in the same
Crowded court dockets, extended
matter, particularly in litigation.
discovery, continuances of trial dates, and protracted appeals may prolong
litigation for four or five years.
The statute of limitations in Arkansas for legal malpractice claims is
three years.' This may create a problem for the client. What happens if the
lawyer acts negligently very early in the representation? Must the client sue
the lawyer during the representation or risk losing the legal malpractice
claim to the statute of limitations?
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE

The continuing representation doctrine developed from the continuing
treatment doctrine in medical malpractice cases.2 Under the continuous
treatment doctrine, the statute of limitations is tolled as long as the patient
is under the continuing care of the negligent doctor for the same injury out
of which the malpractice action arose.'
Two rationales support the continuous treatment doctrine. First, it is
unreasonable to expect a patient to discover that the negligent doctor's acts
may be the cause of the injury while the patient continues to be treated by
the negligent doctor.4 Second, it is absurd to expect a patient to sue the
doctor while the doctor continues to treat the patient.5
The first rationale is supported by four interrelated concerns. First, a
negligent doctor may have reason to conceal his negligence or other
important information from a patient during treatment. 6 Second, the trust
* Timothy 0. Dudley received his bachelors degree and his juris doctor from the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock. He is a trial lawyer currently practicing in Pulaski
County, Arkansas.

1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (Michie 1987); Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763
S.W.2d 76 (1989).
2. Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 365 n.1 (Alaska 1988).
3. Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Iowa 1995).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 520.

6. Id.at 519.

242

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

a patient places in her doctor might inhibit the patient from questioning the
doctor's care during the relationship.7 Third, a patient's inquiry regarding
the doctor's care, or threats to sue the doctor, may interrupt or hinder the
patient's care and treatment.8 Finally, the need for flexibility in determining
the cause of latent injury weighs against requiring the patient to sue the
doctor while the doctor continues the treatment. 9
The second rationale for the continuous treatment doctrine recognizes
that a patient's relationship with the doctor is based upon trust in the
doctor's medical skills.' If the doctor has made a mistake which requires
corrective treatment, the patient's interest in the correct diagnosis of the
problem, cure, and recovery, would be thwarted by requiring her to sue the
doctor during the doctor's treatment. 1
Similar rationales support the continuous representation doctrine. The
premise of the doctrine is to avoid unnecessarily disrupting the attorney/client relationship by requiring the client to sue the lawyer during
representation.12 The doctrine prevents the absurd spectacle of the client
suing the lawyer while the representation continues. 3 A lawyer, as well as
a doctor, may be reluctant to reveal his negligence and may in fact be
motivated to conceal it. Furthermore, damage caused by the lawyer's
negligence may not occur, or be certain, until the representation is
concluded. 4 Finally, the continuous representation doctrine gives the lawyer
an oppQrtunity to correct the mistake or to mitigate any damages caused by
the mistake.'
The majority of states that have considered the continuous representation doctrine have adopted it. 6 Unfortunately, Arkansas is not one of them.

III. THE DOCTRINE IN ARKANSAS
The Arkansas Supreme Court recognizes and follows the continuing
treatment doctrine. The doctrine was first recognized and followed in Lane
v. Lane.' 7 In Lane, the defendant physician began treating the plaintiff for
7. Id.
8. Id. at 519-20.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12.
1996).

RONALD E. MALLEN & VICTOR B. LEvrrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE

§ 391 (4th ed.

13. Id.

14. Pittnan v. McDowell, Rice & Smith, Chartered, 752 P.2d 711 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
15. Id. at 716 (citing MALLEN & LEvITr, supra note 12, § 391, at 460-61).
16. MALLEN & LEVITT, supra note 12, § 21.12.
17. 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988).
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migraine headaches in 1966.18 That treatment continued through 1984,19 and
the patient sued the doctor for malpractice in May 1985.20 Plaintiff survived
motions for summary judgment and directed verdict on the ground that the
statute of limitations barred the action, and recovered a judgment against the
doctor.21 The doctor appealed, claiming that the statute of limitations
expired before the action was filed.22
The Court rejected the doctor's argument, holding the statute of
limitations in a medical malpractice action does not begin to run until
treatment by the doctor for the particular disease or condition terminates. 23
The court recognized that the Arkansas legislature determined that the
statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action begins running at the
date of the wrongful act and at no other time.24 Nevertheless, the court
recognized a steady judicial trend toward acceptance of the continuing
treatment doctrine.2 5 The court also recognized that the bases for the
doctrine are sound.26 Those bases recognized by the court included the
cumulative effect of continuing treatment on the patient, the opportunity the
doctrine extends to a physician to correct the mistake, and the absurdity of
requiring an injured patient to interrupt corrective efforts by suing the
doctor. 27 Since Lane, the Arkansas Supreme Court has adhered to the
continuous treatment doctrine.2
Are lawyers and other professionals entitled to preferential treatment
over doctors? In Arkansas, they are. Although the rationale for the
continuous treatment doctrine is based upon the same considerations
supporting the continuous representation doctrine, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has refused to recognize the continuous representation doctrine. The
court's reasons for doing so are supported by neither logic nor precedent.
In fact, the reasons given by the court for its refusal to recognize the
continuous representation doctrine are equally applicable to the continuous
treatment doctrine. The decisions of the court cannot be reconciled on the
basis of either logic or precedent.
18. Id. at 672, 752 S.W.2d at 26.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id. at 672-73, 752 S.W.2d at 26.
23. Id. at 676-77, 752 S.W.2d at 28.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 675, 752 S.W.2d at 27-28.
26. Id. at 675, 752 S.W.2d at 28.
27. Id.

28. Taylor v. Phillips, 304 Ark. 285, 801 S.W.2d 303 (1990); Tullock v. Eck,
311 Ark. 564, 845 S.W.2d 517 (1993); Green v. National Health Laboratories, Inc.,
316 Ark. 5, 870 S.W.2d 707 (1994).
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In attorney malpractice cases, Arkansas follows the occurrence rule
under which the statute of limitations begins to run when the negligence
occurs. 29 In Chapman v. Alexander, the court stated that it has followed the
occurrence rule in professional malpractice actions for well over one
hundred years.30 However, the court's observation in Chapman cannot be
reconciled with its holdings in professional liability cases.
As discussed above, Arkansas has departed from the occurrence rule in
medical malpractice cases. The court recognizes the continuous treatment
doctrine in medical malpractice cases despite the legislative pronouncement
that the statute of limitations begins to run in medical malpractice cases at
the time of the negligent act, and at no other time.3 The court has actually
departed from the occurrence rule in lawyer malpractice cases as well,
despite its assertions to the contrary. The court's rationale for doing so
differs depending upon the circumstances of the case.
In Stroud v. Ryan3 2 the court followed the "damage rule,"33 not the
occurrence rule. In Stroud, the lawyer negligently failed to respond to a
writ of garnishment served on the client, resulting in entry of a default
judgment against the client.34 The lawyer successfully moved to set aside
the default judgment, but that order was reversed by the court of appeals
more than three years later.35 After the order granting the default judgment
was reinstated on appeal and the client was required to pay the judgment,
the client sued the lawyer.3"
The lawyer obtained summary judgment from the trial court on the
ground that the statute of limitations had expired because the client did not
sue within three years of the time the lawyer failed to answer the writ of
garnishment.3
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the statute of
limitations was tolled during the appeal from the order setting aside the
default judgment.38 The court reasoned that the client could not have sued
the lawyer during the pendency of the appeal because the lawyer's
negligence had caused the client no damage---an essential element of his
29. Chapman v. Alexander, 307 Ark. 87, 88, 817 S.W.2d 425, 425 (1991).
30. Id. at 90, 817 S.W.2d at 427 (citing White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 281 (1877) in
support of the statement that Arkansas follows the occurrence rule).
31. ARK.CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (Michie 1987).
32. 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989).
33. Under the "damage rule," the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
client suffers damage as a consequence of the lawyer's negligence. Pittman v. McDowell,
Rice & Smith, 752 P.2d 711, 715 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
34. Id. at 473, 763 S.W.2d at 77.
35. Id.
36. Id.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 474, 763 S.W.2d at 78.
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claim.39 Thus, the court held that the complaint against the lawyer was
timely filed, although filed more than three years after the lawyer's negligent
act.40
The court's holding in Stroud cannot be reconciled with its statement
in Chapman that Arkansas has followed the occurrence rule in professional
malpractice actions for well over one hundred years. In Stroud, the
negligent act occurred more than three years before the client filed suit.4 '
The court, however, noted that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until the lawyer's negligent act caused damage to the client.42 That is the
classic statement of the damage rule.
The court followed Stroud in Pope County v. Friday, Eldredge &
Clark.43 In Pope County, the court again followed the damage rule. In
Pope County, the lawyer drafted an ordinance providing for the issuance of
bonds to be used for renovation and expansion of the county courthouse.
The ordinance was adopted by the quorum court and approved by the
voters. 44 A taxpayers' suit was subsequently filed, but the taxpayers were
denied relief by the chancellor. 45 The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the
chancellor's decision and held that the bond issue was invalid. 46 More than
three years after the lawyer drafted the ordinance, the county sued the
lawyer for malpractice. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
lawyer, holding that the statute of limitations had expired before the
complaint was filed. The supreme court reversed, holding that the statute
of limitations was tolled during the appeal because the clients could not
have sued during the pendency of the appeal since they had sustained no
damage. 47 Although the court did not concede that it was applying the
damage rule, it clearly was. Again, the court's holding in Pope County
cannot be reconciled with the occurrence rule.
In Wright v. Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, P.A.,48 the court
implicitly applied the continuing representation doctrine. In that case, the
lawyer gave advice regarding reorganization of a corporation and the tax
consequences of reorganization. 4 ' The advice was given in 1985, and a
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 473, 763 S.W.2d at 77.
Id. at 474, 763 S.W.2d at 78.
313 Ark. 83, 852 S.W.2d 114 (1993).
Id. at 84, 852 S.W.2d at 114.
Id.
Id. (citing Keeton v. Barber, 305 Ark. 147, 806 S.W.2d (1991)).
Id. at 85, 852 S.W.2d at 115.
315 Ark. 213, 866 S.W.2d 387 (1993).
Id. at 214, 866 S.W.2d at 388.
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lawsuit against the lawyer was not filed until 1989.' The clients presented
evidence that the reorganization was actually completed in 1986. 51 The
supreme court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
lawyer, essentially holding that the statute of limitations began to run when
the lawyer completed the last act in his representation of the clients:
In Chapman, we made it clear that the limitation period begins to run in
malpractice cases upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the
cause of action. In this case that would be the date of the last act in the
reorganization. If we were to adopt the defendants' position it could
require a plaintiff to bring suit against his attorney before a lengthy
transaction were complete and that, in turn, could well deny the attorney
the chance to effectuate the proper result.52
The court thus recognized one of the principal bases for the continuing
representation doctrine and applied it in the case, reversing the summary
judgment in favor of the lawyer. That decision cannot be reconciled with
the occurrence rule, because the lawyer's negligent act occurred more than
three years before the lawsuit was filed against him.
It is ironic that the court cited Chapman to support its holding in
Wright. In Chapman, the court was explicitly requested to abandon the
occurrence rule and adopt one of three other rules.53 The Chapman court
was asked to adopt the discovery rule,' the "date of injury rule,"" or the
termination of employment rule,56 but declined to adopt any of these
approaches. 57 Nevertheless, the court relied upon its ruling in Chapman in
implicitly applying the continuing representation rule in Wright.
In Chapman, the court gave a number of reasons for its refusal to
depart from its professed adherence to the occurrence rule. Those reasons,
however, are logically inconsistent with the court's holdings in other cases.
The court's first reason for adhering to the occurrence rule is the rule has
a "countervailing fairness about it."'58 Initially, all are treated alike. 59 That
argument can be applied to any statute of limitations issue. If the court
50. Id.

51. Id. at 216, 866 S.W.2d at 389.
52. Id. at 217, 866 S.W.2d at 390 (citation omitted).
53. Chapman v. Alexander, 307 Ark. 87, 88, 817 S.W.2d 425, 425 (1991).
54. Under the "discovery rule," the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
negligent act is discovered or should have been discovered. Id.
55. The "date of injury" rule is the same as the "damage rule." See supra note 33.
56. The "termination of employment" rule is the same as the continuing representation
doctrine. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
57. Chapman, 307 Ark. at 91, 817 S.W.2d at 427.
58. Id. at 88, 817 S.W.2d at 426.

59. Id.
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adopts the continuing representation rule, everyone, whether lawyers or other
professionals, is treated in the same manner. Under the court's current
approach, all professionals are not treated in the same manner. As
previously noted, the court recognized and applied the continuous treatment
doctrine to physicians, thus holding physicians to a different standard that
other professionals.
The court's second reason for adhering to the occurrence rule is that
"an abstractor, accountant, architect, attorney, escrow agent, financial
advisor, insurance agent, medical doctor, stockbroker, or other such person
will not be forced to defend some alleged act of malpractice which occurred
° Applied to the continuous representation doctrine, that
many years ago."'6
argument is unpersuasive. Under the continuous representation doctrine, the
client would be required to sue within three years after the representation
ceased, and thus, the claim would not be stale. The lawyer reasonably
would be expected to have his file and witnesses available to aid in defense
of the claim. Once again, the reason is inconsistent with the court's
adherence to and application of the continuous treatment doctrine. If the
continuous treatment doctrine does not result in forcing a doctor to defend
against a stale claim, how would the continuous representation doctrine force
a lawyer to defend against a stale claim?
Finally, the court reasoned that, because it had adhered to the
occurrence rule for over one hundred years, any change in the statute of
limitations should be made by the legislature, not the courts. 61 The court
noted that "[1]egislative silence after such a long period gives rise to an
arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval of our construction
of the statute." 2 The court cited the 1979 amendment to the Medical
Malpractice Act,63 providing that the statute of limitations on a medical
malpractice claim begins to run on the date of the wrongful act and at no
other time. The amendment was cited in support of the court's reasoning
that the legislature agrees with its application of the occurrence rule and
refusal to recognize other approaches to the statute of limitations in
professional malpractice cases.' The Chapman court seems oblivious to the
fact that it adopted the continuous treatment doctrine in medical malpractice
cases in 1988,65 years after the legislature passed the amendment to the
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 88-89, 817 S.W.2d at 426.
Id. at 90, 817 S.W.2d at 427.
Id.
Id. at 90, 817 S.W.2d at 426.

64. Id.
65. See Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988); see also supra notes 17-28
and accompanying text.
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Medical Malpractice Act. Further, the court made no effort to harmonize
its adoption of the continuous treatment doctrine with its refusal to adopt the
continuous representation doctrine. The court made no attempt to explain
why it was permissible for the court to judicially recognize the continuous
treatment doctrine but not permissible to judicially recognize the continuous
representation doctrine.
After Chapman, the court applied the damage rule in Pope County, and
the continuing representation doctrine in Wright. The court failed to attempt
reconciliation of its holdings in those cases with the holding in Chapman.
Although the court cited Chapman in support of its holding in Wright, the
holdings in those cases are diametrically opposed.
IV. CONCLUSION

The decisions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas on the issue of statute
of limitations in legal malpractice claims cannot be reconciled. Although
purporting to adhere to the occurrence rule, the court has applied either the
damage rule or the continuous representation doctrine in a number of cases.
It is not possible to reconcile or rationalize the court's refusal to apply the
continuous representation doctrine to legal malpractice issues with its
simultaneous application of the continuous treatment doctrine to medical
malpractice issues.
The continuous representation rule is based upon policy, fairness to
clients, and other considerations more sound than those upon which the
occurrence rule is based. The continuous representation doctrine prevents
disruption of the attorney/client relationship, gives the lawyer opportunity
to remedy his negligence or mitigate the damages which his negligence
caused, and relieves the client of the obligation of constantly second
guessing the lawyer. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas should
adopt and apply the continuous representation doctrine with respect to issues
of legal malpractice.

